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Abstract:
Existing empirical studies do not provide a unifying explanation for retail price fixity.  However,
economic hysteresis, or the persistence of an economic phenomenon after its initial cause has
disappeared, offers a general explanation.  Estimates of an empirical model of retail-price hysteresis
using store-level scanner data support our hypothesis. 
JEL Code: 
L130 (Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Oligopoly 
and Other Imperfect Markets (Monopolistic Competition; Contestable Markets)1 In general, category management refers to a set of retail practices designed to optimize sales revenue from
a set of related products by efficiently allocating shelf space, setting relative price points, and offering periodic
promotions on high-volume category components.
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Introduction
Aggregate price rigidity has long been an issue of concern to macroeconomists, primarily because of the
role this phenomenon plays in theories of macroeconomic disequilibrium.  Indeed, the search for a
suitable explanation for fixed nominal prices has become a central part of micro-foundations, drawing
research interest from both macro- and microeconomists alike (Stiglitz; Ball and Romer; Blinder et al.). 
Perhaps of greater concern to microeconomists in general, and others interested in marketing strategy
and channel performance are the implications of fixed retail prices for pricing efficiency within vertical
food marketing channels.  Some argue that by setting retail prices at “price points” suggested by
category management models, retailers may not allow market forces to increase product movement
during times of oversupply.1  If retail prices are not allowed to reflect the fundamentals of supply and
demand, they maintain, both upward and downward wholesale price movements will be exacerbated. 
Further, consumers will not have access to produce at the lowest possible price, so they will consume
less than they would otherwise.  This argument, however, presumes that retail price fixity arises as a
result of imperfectly competitive behavior on the part of food retailers.
Rather, if such retail price fixity results from optimal, competitive behavior on the part of
retailers, then there is little argument against this practice on efficiency grounds.  Indeed, fixed retail
prices may result from retailers’ rational response to high costs of price adjustment (menu costs)
(Akerlof and Yellen; Mankiw; Shonkwiler and Taylor; Slade 1998, 1999; Powers; Levy et al.; Caplin
and Spulber), their recognition of the high search costs incurred by consumers if retail prices adjust
prices too frequently (Lal and Matutes; Warner and Barsky; Bliss; Bils), counter-cyclical price-2-
elasticities (Rotemberg and Saloner; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti), the existence of nominal contracts
between retailers and their customers to maintain stable prices (Okun), constant marginal costs
(Blinder), or simply if prices are not a point of competition given intense non-price rivalry among firms. 
Indeed, even among the explanations that derive from theories of imperfect competition, there is some
question as to whether fixed prices result from a failure of firms to coordinate (Ball and Romer), or from
successful coordination (Stiglitz; Mischel).  Given the myriad of potential and disparate explanations for
fixed retail prices, there is clearly a need for one that subsumes as many of these as possible while
lending itself to empirical tests within a specific industry or product category.  Only by ruling out all
other explanations will we be able to determine whether or not fixed prices do indeed arise from some
form of tacit agreement among retail sellers.
Among existing research, Slade’s (1998) approach of combining menu costs, strategic pricing
behavior and goodwill erosion (or consumer costs) comes the closest to a comprehensive model.  In
fact, menu costs, competitive rivalry and consumer costs may be logically combined to represent a
generalized measure of the costs of changing prices.  Such fixed costs introduce a fundamental non-
convexity to the price-change decision so that prices will not change smoothly in response to underlying
changes in wholesale prices or marketing costs, but rather follow an (sL, S, sU) bounds rule (Sheshinski
and Weiss; Caballero and Engel; Slade 1998, 1999).  According to this rule, a desired, latent price
varies around its target, S, but once it reaches either an upper or lower threshold is immediately
changed to the target value.  However, this is only part of the story.  Indeed, if we combine these high
fixed costs with the underlying volatility of supply typical of many food products, price changes will
involve significant real option values (Dixit 1992).  Thus, the underlying latent price change variable will
vary widely between upper and lower threshold values before actual price changes occur. 
Consequently, observed prices exhibit significant rigidity that may be interpreted as an example of2 Wolman provides a recent and comprehensive review of the extensive literature on price adjustment.
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economic hysteresis, or the reluctance of an economic variable to revert to previous levels even though
the original impetus for change no longer exists.  As a rational, competitive response to volatility and
sunk costs, hysteresis does not represent a market failure, but rather may be exacerbated by
imperfectly competitive pricing behaviors that raise adjustment costs.  Therefore, this study develops an
economic model of retail price fixity that distinguishes between non-competitive sources of rigidity,
namely tacit collusion, and hysteretic, or competitive sources.  Unfortunately, there is little empirical
evidence on a disaggregate level that distinguishes between these sources of price rigidity.   
In a study of price-setting behavior by mail-order catalog retailers, Kashyap finds considerable
support for explanations that rely on menu costs generating endogenous bands around existing nominal
prices and for price-points being set simply for “convenience” or psychological purposes.  Similarly,
Cecchetti uses an econometric analysis to show how magazine sellers absorb significant fluctuations in
margins by maintaining fixed cover prices for long periods of time while Carlton does the same for a
sample of industrial products.  Among studies of price fixity among food products, Slade (1998) uses a
high frequency, store-level data set to show that menu costs dominate variable adjustment costs in
explaining price fixity and, in another paper, finds that strategic pricing among manufacturers
accentuates price thresholds that must be met before actual prices are changed (Slade 1999).  On the
other hand, citing problems with existing econometric approaches of testing explanations for price fixity,
Blinder et al conduct a broad survey of managers in a variety of firms to determine their reasons for
maintaining fixed selling prices.  Failing to find a single, dominant explanation, their findings suggest a
fundamental weakness of existing empirical work, namely that price fixity arises for a number of
different reasons, each unique to the characteristics of the product or industry at hand.2  Consequently,
our approach focuses on a particular product category at one point in the marketing channel and shows-4-
how each of several potential causes may be complementary to one another in causing what may
otherwise be a minor factor to become a significant cause of price fixity.  Our empirical application uses
the econometric model suggested by this conceptual framework to test among several potential
explanations for price fixity.  In this way, we are able to distinguish among a variety of explanations and
also make meaningful comment on the performance of a particular industry sector.
The paper begins by reviewing the conceptual arguments underlying each potential cause of
price fixity.  By forming a synthesis of existing explanations, we are able to venture a new one, namely
economic hysteresis, that subsumes all of the others.  Next, we present a formal economic model of
fixed retail prices that admits each potential cause.  Based on this theoretical framework, we then
develop an empirical model of economic friction that is able to distinguish among a variety of
hypotheses for fixed retail prices.  A detailed description of an application of this econometric model to
retail fresh apple pricing follows, including a discussion of our retail-scanner data set, results from
testing a series of hypotheses regarding likely causes of price fixity, the parametric results, and their
implications for both channel efficiency and management strategy.  We conclude with a discussion of
how these results are likely to apply to product categories and marketing levels that need only share a
few commonalities with our example.
Alternative Explanations for Retail Price Fixity
Among the many potential explanations for price rigidity that Blinder et al explore, only a few are found
to be relevant to firms engaged in retail trade.  By far the most common response by firms of all types in
Blinder et al’s survey, and particularly those in retail trade, is that sticky prices are caused by a “failure
to coordinate” in the words of Ball and Romer (1991).  This explanation recognizes that if prices are-5-
strategic complements, then there may exist multiple equilibria in which firms raise prices to a given
level, but then are reluctant to change them once they are stable (Cooper and John).  However, the
question posed to survey respondents reflects a concept more akin to Sweezy’s or Okun’s notions of a
kinked demand curve in that firms merely expressed a reluctance to be the first to raise prices for fear
of losing market share, or to lower prices for fear of instigating a price war.  If they could coordinate
their price changes, clearly it would be optimal for them all to move together to a new desired price
level.  Although considered distinct explanations, this notion is very similar to the idea that prices are
fixed by “implicit contracts” between a firm and its customers -- maintaining relatively constant prices to
loyal customers benefits firms through higher average prices that result from their inelastic demand, but
also benefits customers by allowing them to save on search costs.  Despite the empirical support for
these explanations in Blinder’s survey, Mischel develops a conceptual model to show that sticky prices
can be the result of a coordination success in an infinite repeated-game context, rather than a
coordination failure.  Indeed, the notion that a failure to coordinate alone is responsible for price fixity is
inconsistent with the price-reaction models of Liang, Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong or Slade (1990)
wherein a variety of firms are found to collude to some degree.  Ball and Romer’s explanation is also at
odds with other empirical research -- based in econometric analysis of secondary price data rather than
survey responses.
In particular, the notion of coordination failure is inconsistent with Stiglitz’s argument, and runs
contrary to much empirical evidence (Lee and Porter; Porter; Brander and Zhang ; Koontz, Garcia,
and Hudson; Richards, Acharya, and Patterson).  Green and Porter’s argument is that fixed prices arise
because oligopolistic firms enforce tacitly collusive price setting arrangements through punishment
strategies based on the shared recognition of trigger prices.  When firms have complete, yet imperfect
information regarding their rivals’ behavior, Green and Porter assume firms begin in a state of collusion,3 This is by no means the only effective punishment strategy.  Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti show that, in a
more general model than Green and Porter, optimal punishments are less benign than a reversion to Nash strategies
and can last for only a single period.
4 Green and Porter develop their model assuming Cournot rivalry, while Porter (1985) considers the same
example from a Bertrand perspective.  As Porter notes, the models differ very little.
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but punish rivals for a single-period defection by reverting to Nash behavior until a cooperative
equilibrium is restored (Friedman).  With complete and perfect information, and with sufficient patience,
such a strategy can support a collusive outcome in a repeated game.3  When information is less than
perfect, however, a firm does not know whether a low price (in the case of output market rivalry)
represents a defection by a rival, or simply results from adverse market conditions.  Employing the
punishment strategy described above results in a discontinuous pattern of behavior, varying between
Cournot and somewhat less than a perfectly collusive outcome.4  This explanation, while not originally
intended as a rationale for fixed prices, has found empirical support in 19th century railroads (Porter,
Lee and Porter, Haltiwanger and Harrison, Hajivassiliou), the airline industry (Brander and Zhang), beef
packing (Koontz, Hudson, and Garcia) and processing potatoes (Richards, Patterson, and Acharya). 
If this explanation is correct, then fixed prices are a direct artifact of strategic behavior in imperfectly
competitive industries.  A trigger price explanation is not the only one based in a oligopolistic pricing
that generates fixed prices, however.  Indeed, Slade (1999) shows that price rivalry widens a firm’s
optimal (sL, S, sU) price-adjustment thresholds, thus creating a wider range of desired prices over which
actual prices remain fixed.  Still other explanations for fixity do not require an assumption of imperfect
competition. 
In fact, Rotemberg and Saloner develop a conceptual model of price wars that uses
countercyclical price or markup behavior as another potential cause of apparently fixed prices.  If
prices fall or do not rise during periods of high demand as we would expect, then this would appear as-7-
a form of price rigidity.  In the Rotemberg and Saloner model, periods of high demand represent
opportunities for profitable cheating on collusive pricing agreements, while the promise of future
punishment is seen as less onerous because demand is expected to be lower.  Thus, collusive
agreements are particularly hard to maintain during periods of high demand, so cheating is more likely to
occur.  While the implications of a cyclical model may seem counterintuitive in many cases, Bresnahan
shows that the tacitly collusive equilibrium among automobile manufacturers broke down in 1955 -- a
period of unprecedented demand.  This result, however, is in direct contrast to the nickel price war
between Inco and Falconbridge which was instigated by a sharp reduction in demand (Slade 1990). 
Neither of these cases addresses the unique nature of pricing in a multi-product consumer retailing
context, however.
Among microeconomic models of retail pricing, Warner and Barsky and Lal and Matutes also
develop models wherein prices move in a counter-cyclical manner, but for different reasons than those
advanced above.  In Lal and Matutes’ loss-leader model, firms must advertise prices if consumers have
imperfect information.  Because advertising is a fixed cost, firms have an incentive to advertise more
intensively products that are in relatively high demand.  Warner and Barsky, on the other hand, maintain
that search represents a fixed cost to consumers.  Consumers will search more intensively during
periods of high demand because they intend to buy more products on each trip, and thus benefit from
economies of scale in the search activity.  This intensive search leads to more elastic demand for all
products.  Similarly, Bils argues that a repeat customer will have a higher willingness to pay compared
to a new customer because they have resolved their uncertainty over untried products, thus giving the
firm greater pricing power over this brand loyal segment.  During periods of high demand, however, the
firm benefits more from lowering prices and attracting new customers rather than exploiting existing
ones.  The empirical evidence on this point is also mixed.5 While menu costs represent a fixed cost of adjusting prices,  responses by rivals or breaking implicit
contracts with customers are both likely to rise with the magnitude of the price change.  The implications of this
difference are important.  Whereas convex adjustment costs, which are typically modeled as quadratic (Rotemberg;
Roberts et al.) yield smooth AR(1) adjustment paths, non-convex adjustment costs mean that it will likely be optimal
for the firm to do nothing until the underlying pressure to change prices exceeds a certain threshold, and then to
adjust immediately to the desired price level (Bar Ilan and Blinder; Caballero and Engel 1993).  Such (S, s) pricing
thresholds (Sheshinkski and Weiss) may also be two-sided, or (s
L, S, s
U) if it is possible for the optimal price to
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In particular, Chevalier et al show using high frequency, product-level, retail price, wholesale
price, promotion and sales data from one retail grocery chain that retailer margins are countercyclical,
thus supporting the loss-leader model of Lal and Matutes rather than the collusive models (Rotemberg
and Saloner, Haltiwanger and Harrington).  Although each of these studies is able to explain why prices
appear to adjust slowly, they do not explain the observation that prices often remain fixed in an absolute
sense for long periods of time.  Indeed, Carlton observes prices for intermediate industrial goods that
often do not change for a year or more, while Kashyap reports similar behavior among retail mail-order
catalog sellers.  Although Carlton claims that counter-cyclical discounting behavior represents more
variation than macroeconomists had come to expect, discrete changes from one level to the next
commonly observed to result from period price cuts are not the same as the smooth and continuous
variation in prices around an equilibrium level that we are conditioned to expect in a competitive
environment.  Rather, it is more likely that firms “...take no action until a threshold is crossed and then
act for sure once the barrier is passed....” (Kashyap), but where the threshold varies over time with the
economic environment similar to the (sL, S, sL) bands model of Caballero and Engel.  Merging demand
considerations with a cost-based approach moves closer to this more general explanation.
In fact, an important branch of micro-foundations research explores the possibility that price
rigidity around a competitive equilibrium is based on considerations of cost rather than demand. 
Namely, non-convex adjustment costs cause discontinuous price paths that lead prices to be fixed for
significant periods of time.5  If price changes entail re-printing catalogs and labels, then such “menuexperience both positive and negative innovations (Slade 1999).
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costs” are likely to cause considerable rigidity as the benefit from changing prices must exceed a
relatively high hurdle before changes are viable (Akerlof and Yellen; Mankiw; Caplin and Spulber).  In
particular, Mankiw shows that very small menu costs may generate relatively long periods of prices that
are apparently fixed.  Moreover, Levy et al, find that menu costs may not be small, but may in fact
represent a significant operational expense for firms that sell many different products simultaneously. 
While they do not explicitly test the significance of menu costs, Lach and Tsiddon cite the costly
adjustment of prices as the only plausible explanation for their observation among multi-product
retailers that price changes tend to be synchronized within stores, but staggered across stores selling
similar products.  Their conclusion supports the argument that price rigidity is a function of institutional
processes -- minimizing the cost of changing several prices at once.  Moreover, this is an important
result as it generalizes the role of menu costs beyond the single-product retailer to the more realistic and
relevant case where the decision maker must set several prices simultaneously.
If we expand the definition of menu costs to include both the direct economic cost of changing
the price itself and the implicit cost in reducing goodwill among consumers, then the menu cost
explanation becomes more plausible and, in fact, broaches many other arguments that attempt to
synthesize the cost- and demand-side explanations.  In particular, Slade (1998) develops a model
wherein the cost of adjusting prices includes both menu costs and the erosion of goodwill and in which
prices are regarded as strategic variables.  As such, her model is able to address both menu-cost and
consumer-cost arguments.  Significantly, she shows that menu costs are sufficient to generate thresholds
of demand that must be broached before price changes occur, and that these thresholds are wider for
firms that behave strategically relative to those that behave in a myopic fashion.  Although menu costs as
traditionally measured may appear to be arguably too small to make a difference, Dixit (1989) shows-10-
that under conditions of dynamic uncertainty, even small fixed costs can make a large difference in
terms of the threshold desired price change required to induce a change in the posted price.  In fact, the
presence of some form of “real option” in the decision to change retail prices may mean that they are
best held constant over a wide range of wholesale prices.  Waiting for wholesale prices to exceed a
threshold that includes a real option value, in turn, gives rise to a form of economic hysteresis. 
Often mistaken for the apparent persistence of an economic effect after its cause has
disappeared, hysteresis is better described as remanence, or the tendency for a shocked variable to
exhibit no memory as to its former location (Piscitelli et al).  Once a retail price is tagged with a new,
higher price, it will tend to remain there until the incentive to move it again becomes overwhelming.  In
the model to follow, the underlying desire to change retail prices comes directly from changes in the
wholesale price, but actual price changes do not follow a smooth, continuous path due to each of the
factors discussed above, namely (1) menu costs, (2) costs imposed by strategic reactions from rival
firms, (3) costs incurred by breaking implicit contracts with customers, (4) internalizing a share of
consumer search costs, or (5) structural factors such as counter-cyclical price elasticities or constant
marginal retailing costs.  However, the degree of hysteresis in observed price changes also depends
upon the volatility of underlying wholesale prices.  Introducing volatility as a factor contributing to price
fixity has counter-intuitive implications.  If wholesale prices are changing frequently, one would think
that retail prices would mimic their pattern.  However, if the volatility is two-sided then retailers would
likely find themselves changing prices only to change them back shortly thereafter, incurring costs,
inciting rival reaction, and needlessly annoying customers.  Consequently, the conceptual model below
incorporates option values into the cost of making a decision to change prices while the econometric
model incorporates all the likely causal factors, including volatility.  In this way, we are able to test the
hypothesis that price fixity derives in part from economic hysteresis. -11-
Conceptual Model of Hysteresis and Price Fixity
Our conceptual model of price fixity rests upon the hysteresis hypothesis, but incorporates other
explanations as potentially exacerbating or ameliorating factors.  Before developing this model formally,
however, we first evaluate the three necessary conditions for the existence of a real option value: (1)
ongoing uncertainty, (2) fixed costs, and (3) a unique opportunity to profit from a decision (Dixit 1989). 
Assuming the wholesale price of a non-processed food product is volatile is not controversial.  Whether
from variations in supply from the farm, seasonal demand factors, prices of competing produce items,
or from the level of imports, there are many factors that may potentially cause the optimal retail selling
price to be uncertain.  Second, Levy et al document the magnitude of adjustment costs in a retail
grocery environment.  While the cost of each individual price change is relatively small, these costs can
be significant as retailers make pricing decisions for entire chains that can now consist of over 2000
stores.  Third, grocery retailers possess some market power over their own shelf space.  Whether
through location, brand identification, loyalty, or advertising, large chains are able to differentiate
themselves sufficiently so that their shelf space is a scarce commodity that they control -- witness the
rise in slotting fees and other payments suppliers must pay for access to retail shelf space.  In summary,
we expect not only an option value to become embodied in the price change decision, but for this
option value to be significant relative to the list price of the product.
For purposes of this study, grocery retailers are assumed to compete as rivals in local,
differentiated product oligopolies.  This assumption is justified due to the importance consumers place
on location in choosing their grocery store and survey evidence that most produce managers set their
prices based on local competition (Produce Marketing Association).  Further, retailers must recognize
the intertemporal impacts of their price-setting decisions due to the existence of fixed costs of price-12-
adjustment (Mankiw; Akerlof and Yellen; Levy et al.; Slade 1998), strategic responses by rivals
(Stiglitz; Gasmi, Laffont, Vuong; and Liang; Slade 1999), higher search costs by price-sensitive
consumers (Warner and Barsky; Lal and Matutes; Bils; Willis), or lost goodwill with consumers used to
a particular level of prices (Rotemberg; Stiglitz; Okun).  The conceptual model that follows incorporates
each of these factors in a general model of retail price adjustment.
Specifically, we begin by defining a desired or “frictionless” price and then examine how
managers change actual prices under general adjustment costs in order to maximize firm value.  To
anticipate results, we show that the firm will follow an (sL, S, sU) pricing policy wherein the desired price
must either rise above an upper threshold or fall before a lower threshold before actual prices change. 
In a commodity-driven vertical marketing channel without storage or significant branding, the underlying
pressure for changing retail prices emanates from the wholesale level.  Therefore, the desired price
change follows a path determined by independent shocks from the supply side, reflected in the
wholesale price, pt
w.  In this framework, a firm will only increase prices when the desired price is
sufficiently greater than the current price, po, such that the benefit from adjusting the price is greater than
total cost of doing so.  Therefore, as in Caballero and Engel (1999), define a firm’s desired price
change as g (pt
w) = pt*(pt
w) - pt
o, with an optimal return point, ct, and the observed price change as
  Further, assume gt is governed by a stochastic process underlying the desired price.  Fixed, or
menu, costs are given by:  where I is an indicator function that is equal to one
when the argument is true and zero otherwise.  Second, assume adjustment costs arising from lost
consumer goodwill (kt) are determined by previous own-price changes (Slade 1999):
  Third, assume prices are strategic complements.  If this is the case,
price reductions by a rival induce like responses, thus imposing a cost in the form of lower profits each
period.  Therefore, adjustment costs due to strategic reactions are: 6 Notice that this cost can be interpreted as the punishment inflicted upon firm i for attempting to cheat on
a tacitly collusive oligopolistic agreement to maintain a given price level.  This cost is assumed to be greater than the
benefit attainable by cheating in order for the punishment to be a credible one (Green and Porter).   We test the
assumption of strategic complementarity in the empirical model below.  Higher profits (negative costs) due to a




R is an index of rival retail prices in each market.6  Consequently, the value of a firm not
currently selling at its desired price is the maximum of whether it adjusts or does not adjust (Caballero
and Engel):
Solving this problem, therefore, requires finding the values of g that constitute optimal switching points
between a firm that does not change prices and one that does and how these switching points, or
thresholds, depend on each potential cost of adjusting prices.   
Unlike other menu cost explanations, our explanation for price fixity holds that the difference
between a firm’s existing and ideal prices must be large enough to not only cover the direct costs of
adjustment, but also the implicit option value of waiting to make the change.  Indeed, even for small
menu, goodwill, or strategic costs, we show that ongoing uncertainty in the supply price can cause a
wide gap between the frictionless and current prices to arise.  Waiting for the frictionless price to either
rise or fall enough to induce a change in actual prices represents hysteresis, or the apparent reluctance
of retail prices to change.
In contrast to Caballero and Engel and Slade (1999), who solve adjustment problems similar to
(1) using stochastic dynamic programming, a contingent claims approach (Dixit 1989, 1992) provides
an analytical solution that is more amenable to deriving explicit hypotheses as to the effect of each
potential cause on the likely size of a price adjustment.  Therefore, assuming the underlying desired




where : is the mean growth rate, F is the standard deviation of the process, and dz defines the Wiener
increment with properties: E(dz) = 0 and E(dz2) = dt.  In order to derive the optimal price-change
decision rule, compare the value of a firm that decides to change prices with one that does not using the
value functions in (1). With adjustment costs, and uncertainty of the form shown in (2), the value of a
firm that does not adjust consists of capitalized sub-optimal operating profits plus the value of the option
to adjust prices, while the value of a firm that does adjust is the discounted value of optimal operating
profit.  Note that, although our initial solution concerns a firm that decides to increase prices, a directly
analogous reasoning, with potentially different adjustment costs, yields a lower threshold for the
decision to reduce prices.  Given the process represented by (2), the fundamental differential equations,
or asset equilibrium condition (Hull; Dixit 1989), for an firm that decides not to adjust is found by
applying Ito’s lemma to the value function in (1) and equating the instantaneous expected return to the
required return on the firm’s invested capital:
where D is the required rate of return and the other variables are as previously defined.  The general
solution to (3) is found by trying g2 in the homogeneous part and solving the resultant quadratic
equation:






Further, because the wholesale price, and hence the ideal price, drifts at an average rate of : the
particular solution for a firm that adjusts must reflect this fact so we can write:
for Ai and Bi to be determined, while the value of a firm that decides to adjust is:
Solving for these constants is possible if we recognize that for small values of g the value of the option
to wait will be very low, so AN = 0.  Further, at a sufficiently high level of g, call it the upper threshold,
or g+, a firm will immediately adjust its shelf price so the value of a non-adjusting firm must equal the
value of a firm that does adjust less the fixed cost of adjustment: 
because the value of a firm that adjusts is equal to the capitalized value of operating income at the
desired price level.  Next, the smooth pasting condition requires that the incremental value of waiting to
adjust prices as g rises must be equal to the incremental value of a firm that has already adjusted, or:
The smooth pasting and value matching conditions yield two equations and two unknowns.  Solving-16-
(10)
these for g+ gives a closed-form expression for the threshold desired price change as a function of the
parameters of the model:
where $2 is, in turn, a function of both the drift rate and volatility of wholesale prices from (7) and is
strictly greater than one in value.  Using traditional economic investment rules, a retailer changes prices
if the desired price change exceeds the annualized fixed cost of doing so: g+ > (F + C(k) + R (pR))(D -
:).  However, because $2 is greater than one, the existence of a real option creates a wedge between
the traditional and true thresholds that depends on the volatility of underlying prices and the magnitude
of the all adjustment costs.  Because a similar reasoning and calculation applies to the case when the
ideal price is falling, the gap becomes even larger than that suggested by (10) and can, in fact, be
asymmetric depending upon the value of the $2 parameter for falling prices.  Either direction, waiting for
the disequilibrium to exceed a more distant threshold appears as hysteresis, or what we interpret as
retail price fixity.  
Empirical estimation of the size of this gap is complicated by the fact that $2 is a highly non-
linear function of the volatility and drift of desired prices.  Willis; Slade (1999); Caballero and Engel;
and Cecchetti, each estimate different types of “adjustment hazard function” in order determine the
factors that influence the probability that a firm changes its list price.  However, we are less interested
here in the probability of a price change than the size of the thresholds that give rise to fixity. 
Consequently, the empirical model we describe here not only provides estimates of each threshold, but
also a means of testing various theories of price fixity.  We explain how in the next section.  -17-
Empirical Model of Price Fixity
 
Hysteresis has many implications for the process followed by high-frequency, product-specific retail
price data.  First, the observed retail price will not change despite considerable variation in a latent
(unobservable) desired price.  Second, the extent to which the desired price fluctuates before actual
prices are changed (the threshold disequilibrium) will rise with the volatility of the desired price level. 
Third, the thresholds will rise with the magnitude of fixed (menu) costs of price adjustment as well as
with the costs of any lost consumer goodwill or punishment from rival price reactions.  Fourth, the price
series will show significant irreversibility, meaning that when price changes do occur, they tend to persist
even after their apparent cause has disappeared, and fifth, upward price changes need bear no
quantitative relationship to the size of downward price changes so price adjustment may be asymmetric. 
We test each of these hypotheses by specifying an econometric model of economic “friction” (Rosett)
wherein observed retail prices do not change until an underlying desired price either rises above, or falls
below a certain threshold level.  With this approach, we are able to test whether alternative
explanations for price fixity remain valid once we account for hysteresis.  Prior to developing the
empirical friction model, we first describe how we account for each of these alternate explanations of
price fixity.
In each case, we find that higher costs of adjustment, whether imposed by rivals, consumers, or
menu costs, widen the hysteresis bounds and thus contribute to the fixity of retail prices.  To measure
the first effect, that emanating from rival price changes, we construct an index of rival prices in first-
difference form.  The index consists of a volume-share weighted average of each competitor’s apple
price in each geographic market.  We choose rival chain prices, rather than prices for potential
substitute products within the same chain, for the same reasons that we use rival-chain quantities in the-18-
demand function above.  Moreover, to account for irreversibilities that hysteresis may cause, we also
include the cumulative change of rival prices.  If prices are indeed strategic complements, we expect to
see rival price responses widen a firm’s own price thresholds as successive rounds of price cuts cause
an industry-wide loss in profit.  Next, we define goodwill in terms of a firm’s reputation for maintaining
stable price levels.  Changes to this accepted price, both now and in the past, represent an erosion of
goodwill that imposes a cost on the firm (Slade 1999). We measure goodwill in two ways.  First,
consumers’ most recent memory is likely to be the most important, so we include a one-period lagged
change in the retail price to capture the most recent experience.  Second, reputation is an inherently
dynamic concept, so we proxy a firm’s reputation for price stability by including the sum of the absolute
value of retail price changes since the beginning of the sample period.  Taking these two factors
together, therefore, the cost of lost goodwill can be approximated as a linear function of each such that:
 Again, including cumulative changes allows us to test whether this
effect is irreversible.  Other factors may arise not from consumer behavior toward the firm, but its own
cost structure.
Therefore, we account for changes in fixed costs of price adjustment by including an index of
retailing costs.  Retail costs are, in turn, defined as an index of four cost components: labor in food
stores, labor in the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector, an index of transportation and
utility costs and an energy cost index.  The weight of each component in the overall index is taken from
USDA sources (Elitzak).  We include both the most recent change and cumulative change in retail costs
and wholesale prices again to isolate short-run pressures to change price from any irreversibility
endgendered by hysteresis.  Besides the three theories of price fixity that we are able to test with the
variables defined so far, there are others that derive from structural conditions in the industry.
In particular, the pressure to change prices may also arise from attributes of the particular-19-
(11)
product market, namely the structure of supply (cost) and demand.  If marginal costs are constant over
a wide range of output levels, then there is no competitive cost-pressure to change prices (Blinder, et
al.).  To test this hypothesis, we include a weekly measure of chain-level output to account for any size-
related cost economies.  Specifically, if there are any unexploited scale economies then we expect to
witness narrower price-bounds.  In addition, countercyclical variation in demand elasticities may also
help explain retail price fixity.  We account for this possibility by including a time-varying estimate of the
inverse elasticity of demand, which we obtain by estimating an inverse-demand curve over the same
data set, into the second-stage friction model.  The demand curve estimated for this purpose is:
where q0 is own quantity, qR is rival quantity, qF is the quantity of other fruit sold in the same store, y is
regional per capita income, M is a store-based binary variable, t is a linear time trend and , is assumed
to be an i.i.d. normal error term.  With this function the time-varying inverse elasticity of demand is:
when evaluated at the mean of the data.  By controlling for these structural
factors, our tests of the remaining hypotheses are likely to be more credible.
As suggested above, testing the specific implications of hysteresis requires a specification that
captures the effects of: (1) irreversibility, (2) volatility, and (3) asymmetry on the desired price change.  
We allow for the possibility that each of the factors underlying price fixity has an irreversible effect on
actual price changes by segmenting each explanatory variable into two separate variables, one
representing cumulative increases from the previous period to T periods in the past and the other
representing cumulative reductions (Vande Kamp and Kaiser; Wolffram and Houck).  Define zt as a
vector consisting of both changes in the underlying wholesale price as well as each of the “threshold-20-
(12)
(13)
factors” -- previous own-price changes, rival price changes and changes in retailing costs – we then
write each variable as:
To avoid the multicollinearity problems reported by Vande Kamp and Kaiser that result from including
each of the J = 0, 1, 2, ... T segmented regressors in the same model, we restrict our analysis to one
value of T, consisting of the entire sample period.  This assumption is useful for two reasons.  First,
allowing for permanent effects of transient phenomena is consistent with the notion of hysteresis used
here.  Second, the relatively short sample period means that “permanent” effects persist for a length of
time that is easily within a retailer’s likely price-planning horizon.  Segmenting each explanatory variable
in this way also allows us to test for asymmetry in price response.  Clearly, there is no a priori reason
to expect the magnitude of upward price revisions to mirror downward revisions.  Further, to allow for
the possibility that price changes exhibit more normal long term reversibility, we also include lagged
values of the change in each element of z.  In contrast to the short term irreversibility case, a positive
response to )zi,t-1 implies that desired price changes of sufficient size induce a price response that
reverses itself when )zi,t-1 returns to its prior value.  Including each of these variables in a linearized
version of (10) (Slade; Cabellero and Engel; Cecchetti) results in a model for the desired price change
as a function of the wholesale price: -21-
(14)
(15)
and the option-values as a function of each of the other elements of z:  
where k = 1 represents the upper (+) threshold, k = 2 the lower (-),  ut is an i.i.d normal error term, " "
is a vector of parameters describing the effect of wholesale price variation on the desired price change,
and $ $ is a vector parameterizing option values.  However, the distribution of retail price changes is not
continuous as observed prices tend to remain fixed if the desired price change and option values are
between the upper and lower thresholds.  As is well known, application of ordinary least squares to
(13) and (14) results in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates, so we require a framework that
instead recognizes that the distribution of retail price changes is likely to be censored at the upper and
lower thresholds.  
To account for this fact, we divide the data into regimes of falling, rising, and stable prices and
estimate the parameters of the combined equations (13) and (14) using Rosett’s friction model.  With
this approach, we are able to estimate both the size of each threshold as well as test the effect of each
explanatory variable on the extent of hysteresis likely to be present.  Formally, separating the desired
price change into traditional and option-value driven components, the observed price change becomes:  
Where gt
+ is the desired price increase, and gt
- is a desired price reduction.  Assuming the error term u-22-
(16)
is normally distributed, M is the unit-normal cumulative density function and N is the probability density
function, the likelihood function for the above problem is written as:
defined over regimes of n1 observations where the price rises, n2 observations where it falls, and n3
observations with no change.  With this model, we are able to estimate both the potentially persistent
effects of each element of z on observed retail price changes as well as impact of drift and volatility in
underlying prices.  Moreover, with high-frequency, store-level data on a specific grocery product we
are also able to test whether price fixity is an artifact of imperfectly competitive pricing, if price changes
are inhibited by adjustment costs (or driven by changes in operating or acquisition cost), or if prices are
fixed due to consumer habit formation, brand loyalty (store loyalty), or counter-cyclical elasticities. 
Data Description
The price data for this study consist of two years of weekly observations of store-level retail scanner
and wholesale (FOB) prices for Red Delicious apples.  We select Red Delicious apples to test our
hypotheses regarding price fixity for several reasons: (1) our objectives are to investigate why price
fixity exists even in a product with volatile wholesale prices – typically not the case for consumer
packaged goods, (2) apples are the third largest component of the fresh fruit category in aggregate
behind only bananas and grapes, (3) Red Delicious apples are the only variety offered consistently in all
sample stores in all markets, and (4) wholesale prices are readily available for fresh produce.  Whereas-23-
fresh apples are available only on a seasonal basis, the widespread use of controlled atmosphere
storage over the sample period means that there are 104 weeks of price data for each market.  Retail
price and movement data are from  a commercial data vendor located in Chicago, Illinois that maintains
a large-scale retail produce scanner database. Our sample consists of a total of 24 retail accounts
(supermarkets) from six regional markets: Albany, NY, Chicago, IL, Dallas, TX, Atlanta, GA, Los
Angeles, CA, and Miami, FL.  These markets are selected based on the market coverage provided by
the available database (an average of 70% ACV (all category volume)) as well as their geographic
distribution throughout major population centers in the U.S.  The scanner data provide price and
movement data for all product codes within a given category, so we are able to construct a data series
that is as consistent as possible among the sample stores.  Wholesale prices are from the Washington
Growers’ Clearing House in Wenatchee, WA, while all retailer cost and regional income data are from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Table one provides a summary of each variable used in the empirical
model.  This summary, however, does not reveal the pattern of primary interest to us here.
[ Table 1 in here ]
Most of the empirical analyses of price fixity in other industries devote a considerable amount of
effort in verifying that prices did indeed appear to be fixed (Cecchetti; Lach and Tsiddon; Kashyap;
Levy et al.).  More recent studies, on the other hand, take such observations as stylized facts and rather
seek to explain why they appear so.  As the only research to focus on a product that is typically
regarded as a commodity, however, it is particularly important for us to establish that price points do
indeed exist at the store-level and that this price fixity is maintained in the face of considerable variation
in wholesale prices.  Figure 1 shows the pattern of wholesale (FOB) prices in Washington State, the
primary source for most Red Delicious apples consumed in the U.S., and retail prices for representative
stores in each of our six sample markets.  Clearly, retailers absorb much of the variation in wholesale-24-
prices without passing changes immediately on to consumers.  In fact, prices in stores 1 and 3 do not
change over the entire sample period, while managers of store 4 appear to hold prices constant for long
periods of time before making a significant change to a new level.  Only in store 6 do retail prices
change significantly from week to week and even then apparently not in response to changes in
wholesale prices.  While others attribute such imperfect pass-through directly to imperfect competition
in the retail industry, our analysis suggests that there may indeed be other explanations that are entirely
consistent with optimal firm behavior in a competitive industry.  However, simple graphics such as figure
1 are insufficient to prove this point, so we must defer to our econometric estimates. 
[ Figure 1 in here ]
Results and Discussion
Given the results of Blinder et al., it is important to control for structural reasons why retail prices may
appear fixed in order to accurately estimate the independent effect of each potential “behavioral” cause. 
To account for the possibility that counter-cyclical demand elasticities explain price fixity, we first
estimate a time-varying demand elasticity for Red Delicious apples so that we may include it as an
explanatory variable in the full price adjustment  model.  The results obtained by estimating equation
(11) are in table 2.  Prior to interpreting these results, however, there are two features of this
specification that require further explanation.  First, we include rival store quantities for Red Delicious
apples rather than quantities for other products in the same store because produce managers follow
similar strategies for each category, thus creating multicollinearity problems if we were to use same-
store quantities.  Further, selling strategies are formed at a chain-level so comparing sales among
different varieties in the same chain would be uninteresting.  Moreover, it is not our objective to
construct an exhaustive model of store-level apple demand, so we keep this specification as-25-
parsimonious as possible while ensuring that the elasticity estimates that result are consistent.  
Second, there are plausible arguments for either price or quantity endogeneity in a retail
produce environment.  However, it is our thesis that managers adjust prices to clear markets when they
are provided sufficient incentive to do so.  Nonetheless, instead of assuming price endogeneity a priori
we use a Hausman test to determine which specification is appropriate in these data.  For both price-
and quantity-dependent specifications, ordinary least squares is efficient under the null hypothesis of
quantity- and price-exogeneity, respectively, while two-stage least squares is the only consistent
estimator under the alternative. Applying this test to the apple data, we find a Chi-square statistic of
5.795 for the inverse (quantity exogenous null hypothesis) and 540.105 for the direct (price exogenous)
demand model.  With four degrees of freedom at a 5% level of significance the critical Chi-square value
is 9.49, so we reject the null hypothesis of price exogeneity and fail to reject quantity exogeneity. 
Based on this result, we calculate the inverse price elasticity using an inverse demand model.  By
controlling for variations in the elasticity of demand in the price change model, and variations in marginal
cost by including chain-level measures of sales quantity (and hence economies of scale), any remaining
evidence of fixity is more likely due to the possible causes outlined above.  Prior to testing the
significance of each of these factors, however, we first establish the validity of the friction model.
[Table 2 in here ]
At the core of the friction model is the assumed stochastic process underlying wholesale prices.
To determine whether (1) is an appropriate specification for apple prices, we estimate the discrete
version suggested by Dixit and Pindyck and test for the significance of the drift and volatility terms.  At
a 5% level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the drift in wholesale prices is zero, so we proceed
with a simplified process for wholesale prices.  
Next, we test the friction model itself by applying three tests based on the parameter estimates7 A single-regime OLS model is not nested within the general friction model.  If we reject the more general
two-regime alternative, however, single stage OLS will be more efficient than the likelihood estimation described in
equation (17).  Note that this is also a test of the symmetry of upward and downward price adjustments.  
-26-
shown in table 3: (1) the significance of both cumulative increases and decreases of zi in each regime,
(2) a single regime versus three-regime model, and (3) zero threshold values.  The first test is required
to determine whether a more parsimonious representation of observed price change is preferred to the
most general model presented in (16).  This test yields a Chi-square statistic of 829.894, easily
rejecting the simplified model at a 5% level of significance and eight degrees of freedom.  Therefore, we
conduct all subsequent tests using the general friction model.  Second, we compare the three-regime
friction model to one that consists of a single price-adjustment regime.  In order to nest the single-
regime special case within the general friction model, we restrict all parameters to be equal between
upward and downward adjustments and apply a likelihood ratio test.7  This test produces a Chi-square
statistic of 523.771, again suggesting rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the general model at a
5% level and 21 degrees of freedom.  Third, we determine if the price-adjustment function exhibits (sL,
S, sU) bounds similar to those found by Slade (1999) or Sheshinski and Weiss by testing whether the
option value terms are equal to each other and jointly equal to zero (Shonkwiler and Taylor).  This test
provides a Chi-square value of 203.464, so we again reject the null hypothesis of equality at a 5% level
and 13 degrees of freedom.  However, the existence of non-zero thresholds is not the only implication
of hysteresis.  
[ Table 3 in here ]
As explained above, three further hypothesis tests evaluate whether or not a real option value
and the attendant hysteretic effect represent plausible explanations for retail price fixity.  In testing the
validity of the friction model we establish the first of these, namely, that there is indeed a significant real
option value embedded in both the decision to increase and to decrease prices.  Therefore, any desired-27-
price change must be greater (in absolute value) than in a traditional menu cost model by the value of
this option.  Second, the remanence attribute of hysteresis suggests that if a threshold is exceeded, the
effect will be irreversible.  A test of this hypothesis involves establishing whether actual prices change in
response to either current or cumulative changes in the desired price.  If current (or most recent lagged)
values are more important, then any impact on actual prices of a change in the desired price must be
reversible, whereas the significance of accumulated changes in the desired price suggests irreversibility.  
Given that lagged changes in wholesale prices are insignificant for both price increases and decreases
(see table 3), but their cumulative changes are significantly different from zero in both regimes, we can
conclude that changes in the desired price do indeed have an irreversible impact on actual prices
changes – as expected if they exceed either the upper or lower threshold.  If each of the other factors
have similar irreversible effects, then these results may add support to the hysteresis argument.  
The results in table 3 show that this is indeed the case – that the single period lag value of each
variable exerts an insignificant impact on the size of a price change, whereas cumulative changes are
significant in both directions.  Specifically, consumer goodwill, measured by recent and cumulative
changes in the own price, has an irreversible effect both when prices are rising and falling.  Similarly,
changes in rival prices have an effect that persists beyond one period.  This result supports Stiglitz’s
contention that price fixity may arise out of a dynamic process of tacit collusion because the objective of
punishing a rival is to ensure that they don’t change prices against the better, collusive interests of the
industry group.  Finally, changes in retailing costs, both in terms of wholesale prices and menu costs,
have irreversible effects on own-price changes, but are not long-term reversible.  Consequently, the
weight of empirical evidence of irreversibility or remanence provides considerable support for the
hysteresis hypothesis.  Nonetheless, such persistence may still be due to other factors (institutional
rigidity, or time lags in implementation) so still constitutes only partial proof.  A third factor, volatility of-28-
the desired price, however, is unique to the hysteresis argument.
Measured as the three-week moving variance of wholesale prices  to capture the underlying
volatility of supply, the estimates in table 3 show that volatility is a key factor in determining real option
values, and hence reducing the rate at which observed prices change.  For price increases and
decreases, the marginal impact of a one cent change in the variance of wholesale prices implied by the
parameter estimates in table 3 are -2.9 and -4.9 cents, respectively, suggesting that this effect is not
only statistically significant, but economically important as well.  Therefore, these results show that real
option values do exist with respect to both price increases and reductions and that they give rise to
hysteresis, and hence fixity, in retail prices.  This result supports a somewhat counter-intuitive prediction
following from the conceptual model, namely that retail prices will be more rigid the more volatile are
wholesale prices.  Higher wholesale price volatility leads to a higher option values, which in turn, leads
to a larger hysteresis effect.  Intuitively, if a retailer does not know what his FOB price is going to be
from one day to the next, he is better off to not even try to track the changes with retail prices, but
rather hold his list prices at long term average values.  This does not mean, however, that the other
explanations are not valid, but rather hysteresis may instead exacerbate other causes of price fixity.
Specifically, our model allows for goodwill costs, strategic rivalry, menu costs, and the structure
of both demand and supply as potential complementary explanations.  Assuming goodwill falls if a firm
changes an otherwise stable price, we expect own-price changes to widen the distance between upper
and lower price change thresholds.  Given that the estimates in table 3 imply that both cumulative
upward and downward price changes cause observed price changes in the same direction to be
smaller, this implies that price changes are attenuated by previous price changes.  At least in these data,
goodwill costs are a plausible cause of fixity.  This effect is at least partially supported by strategic
responses to others’ price changes.-29-
Indeed, changes in rival prices induce a similar effect to own-prices while prices are rising, but
an opposite one when they are falling.  Normally, an increase in a rival price would cause a positive
own-price response if prices are strategic complements.  However, if matching price increases impose 
a cost on the first firm that increases the option value inherent in its own price change, then the desired
response is reduced through the hysteretic effect.  On the other hand, when prices are falling the
incentive for a firm to match its rival’s price, whether positive or negative, is greater than the option
value created so observed prices move in the same direction as rival prices.  This is similar to the
kinked demand curve argument of Okun or Sweezy where price increases are met with inherent forces
to reverse themselves, but price reductions are not.  More importantly, this result can be interpreted as
support for Stiglitz’ conjecture that price fixity results from dynamic processes of punishment and
capitulation intended to sustain a collusive oligopoly.  According to these results, price cuts by a rival
induce larger price cuts by a firm intent on punishing a rival for doing so as they revert to Nash
behavior.  Similarly, price increases are met with “soft” responses as the firm falls in line to a new
cooperative equilibrium.  These results are particularly compelling given that we also control for changes
in retailing costs.
In particular, changes in retailing costs tend to support price movements in the same direction. 
In the first column of table 3, higher direct costs cause retailers to raise prices despite the fact that the
real option value imbedded in this decision is likely to rise as well.  On the other hand, higher costs
support lower price reductions, while lower costs allow retail prices to fall faster.  Again, it is clear from
this result that the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect in the opposite direction of wider price-
change thresholds.  It may also be the case, of course, that some of the effect of higher costs is reflected
in the econometric results through the coefficients on own-price changes.  Despite the importance of
each of these factors, table 3 also shows that structural factors within the market are also likely to-30-
impact the decision to change prices.
In contrast to each of the price or cost variables, the elasticity of demand and level of output do
not appear in cumulative-change form because the theory does not suggest that changes in either are
likely to cause retail prices variation, but rather their values are thought to condition the way in which
firms respond to other factors.  In contrast to Rotemberg and Saloner, Warner and Barsky; or Lal and
Matutes these results lend support to a notion of pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical demand
elasticities.  Because the variable 0 is an inverse-demand elasticity, higher values indicate a “steeper”
demand curve, or a more inelastic demand curve as traditionally measured.  Therefore, we expect
retailers to be more willing to increase prices during a surge in demand, rather than less as the
aforementioned authors suggest.  Indeed, this result is opposite to the expected effect if counter-cyclical
demand elasticities are truly a structural cause of price fixity.  On the supply side, however, the apple
price data show that attempts to either raise or lower prices are attenuated with greater sales levels. 
Smaller price changes with higher quantity tend to support the notion that prices will be fixed if marginal
cost curves tend to flatten with scale.  Because of the complexity of retailing costs and the imprecision
with which they are typically measured, however, a more careful analysis of this issue would be
required to arrive at a more definitive conclusion.   
Conclusions and Implications
This study addresses the ongoing debate over the cause, or causes, of retail price fixity.  While much of
the historical concern over price fixity focuses on the role of fixed nominal prices in monetary non-
neutrality, microeconomists are increasingly concerned with the efficiency implications of retail prices
that do not change even though wholesale prices exhibit significant volatility.  Indeed, suppliers claim-31-
that fixed retail prices harm the supply sector because the price mechanism is not being allowed to fulfill
its essential role as an allocation mechanism.  By insulating consumers from fluctuations in supply and
demand, suppliers are forced to absorb more volatility than would otherwise be the case.  Further,
suppliers also believe that consumers do not buy as much as they would if retail prices followed
wholesale fluctuations more closely.  Considerable evidence exists in support of a wide variety of
potential explanations for retail price fixity, including fixed or menu costs of adjustment to strategic
pricing behavior, consumer dynamics or structural causes rooted in the shape of market demand or firm
supply curves.  However, this study maintains that the presence of even small adjustment costs, arising
from any source, in an environment of ongoing uncertainty is likely to cause a significant real option
value to arise in any price-change decision.  Thus, wholesale price volatility is likely to explain a
significant part of price fixity.
To test this hypothesis, we develop an empirical model of economic friction which posits upper
and lower thresholds (option values) that must be exceeded before actual prices change.  We estimate
this model with two years of store-level retail price data on Red Delicious apples.  Our results support
our central hypothesis that real option values and, hence, hysteresis are important factors contributing to
price fixity.  Perhaps counter-intuitively, this finding implies that retail prices adjust more slowly the
more volatile are underlying wholesale prices.  Because option values, and hence hysteresis, rise with
volatility, the optimality of doing nothing becomes more clear the more variable are wholesale prices. 
Instead of trying to track day to day FOB price variations, therefore, a retailer will be better off to leave
prices fixed at some long term average value.  However, we also show that other types of adjustment
cost, namely lost goodwill, strategic punishment from rival retailers, or fixed menu costs tend to support
the hysteretic effect of real options in reducing the rate of retail price changes.  In fact, the empirical
results show support for Stiglitz’ notion that fixed retail prices may arise as a result of retailers tacitly-32-
following trigger-price strategies intended to sustain cooperative oligopoly solutions.  If this is indeed the
case, then there is a strong anti-competitive argument to the existence of fixed retail prices.  Other
causes, however, are entirely consistent with competitive behavior.
Indeed, our results support the contention that retail price fixity arises simply from relatively flat
cost curves among retail outlets.  On the other hand, we do not find support for a rather large part of
the literature that argues for retail price fixity as an artifact of counter-cyclical price elasticities.  In fact,
we find the opposite is more likely to be true in our retail apple price data. 
In order to arrive at more conclusive evidence as to the causes of price fixity, however, future
research should seek to apply a similar, general framework to other retail price data – data for other
products, temporal samples, or even levels of the vertical marketing channel.  Further, deeper scrutiny
of this issue would invite the analysis of the role of multiple products in retailers’ product portfolio

































Figure 1. Store-Level Retail Prices in Six Markets and Wholesale Price: 1998 - 1999
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Table 1. Summary of Retail Apple Price Model Data: 1998 - 1999
Variable
1 N Mean Std. Dev. Variance Minimum Maximum
p
0 2080 1.034 0.306 0.093 0.200 1.580
q
0 2080 37.697 55.119 3038.200 0.022 768.440
p
R 2080 0.682 0.285 0.081 0.000 1.452
q
R 2080 35.951 49.741 2474.200 0.008 549.560
p
w  2080 0.257 0.039 0.002 0.190 0.330
F F
2
w 2080 0.224 0.209 0.044 0.003 0.884
C 2080 7.435 0.428 0.183 6.597 8.406
) )p
0 2080 0.002 0.085 0.007 -0.720 0.59
1 In this table, the variables are defined as follows: p
0 = retailer’s own price ($ per pound); q
0 = retailer’s
own weekly quantity movement (‘000 pounds); p
R = index of rival prices for each store and market; q
R = weighted
average of rival’s shipments; p
w = wholesale or FOB price; F
2
w = moving variance of wholesale price; C = input price
index, and )p
0 = weekly change in retail shelf price. 













1 In this table, a single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level.  Store-level effects are not included in
this table due to space constraints, but are available from the authors.-35-
Table 3. Estimates of Retail Price Friction Model
Variable
 Definition
Price Increases Price Decreases
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Underlying Prices: 
Lagged change in wholesale price -10.269 -0.313 -9.257 -0.346
Cumulative decrease in wholesale 17.321* 2.213 15.349* 2.842
Cumulative increase in wholesale -33.680* -3.541 -4.709* -4.300
Structural Factors:
0 0 Inverse elasticity of demand 0.002* 2.642 0.003* 2.233
q
0 Own quantity sales -0.051* -146.94 0.043* 3.658
Threshold Factors:
Lagged change in own price 19.112 0.979 10.436 1.852
Cumulative decrease in own price -11.603* -3.343 -20.569* -6.483
Cumulative increase in own price -7.674* -2.196 -23.719* -7.515
Lagged change in rival price 5.760 1.682 3.341 0.787
Cumulative decrease in rival price -7.375* -3.122 5.122* 2.469
Cumulative increase in rival price -5.584* -2.187 3.133* 3.350
Lagged change in cost -6.24 -1.282 6.005 1.263
Cumulative decrease in cost 1.167* 2.590 -1.486* -2.806
Cumulative increase in cost -4.624* -2.04 4.897* 2.285
Constant Constant term 16.410* 10.182 -14.650* -8.862
F F
2 Wholesale price variance -2.897* -3.109 -4.900* -3.872
     1 In this table, a single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level.  The variables and parameters are defined as
follows: p
0 = retailer’s own price, p
R = index of rival prices in same market, p
R = wholesale (FOB) price, C = index of
input prices, 0 = inverse price elasticity of demand, q
0 = level of own output for each store, and F
2 =  variance of
wholesale prices. -36-
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